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Abstract: This paper discusses ARMA 3 (2013), a military simulation game from Bohemia 
Interactive. Through the placement of prominent visual representations of renewable power 
generation in ARMA 3’s islands, the game offers a compelling vision of the future in which 
current resistance to low-carbon and renewable economies has been overcome. I argue that the 
potential of this vision to challenge existing cultural futures and imaginaries is dependent on its 
presentation aesthetically and not, as is often suggested by current games literature, on game 
mechanics operating in a ‘persuasive’ or didactic mode. Instead, I argue that ARMA 3’s ‘aesthetic 
vision’ possesses the ability to skirt around the ideological resistances players may have about 
accepting more explicit or direct modes of addressing the highly charged and ideologically 
contested reality of anthropogenic climate change. In this way I suggest ARMA 3 offers a 
compelling challenge to current theories about games ability to influence players. 
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Introduction - ARMA 3 
 
ARMA 3 (2013) is a military first person shooter simulation game, touted by its developers 
Bohemia Interactive as ‘a massive military sandbox.’ Initially launched without a single player 
campaign but with tools for fans to create numerous scripted scenarios and mods, the game is 
primarily a multiplayer sandbox with scope for a range of gameplay types within the limits of the 
ARMA engine’s infantry and vehicular focus. The game takes place on one of two large islands, 
with no set levels, checkpoints, or invisible walls, giving the game a sense of existing in one 
massive connected space. Added sometime after release, a single player campaign takes the 
player through a series of difficult scripted missions, which impose some structure on the 
player’s movement through the freeform environment. These missions contain some passable 
voice acting and mixed dialogue and plotting, and were clearly not a primary focus of 
development. Instead, ARMA 3 is often described as more akin to a ‘platform’ than a typical 
game. YouTuber and occasional Bohemia Interactive consultant Andrew ‘Dslyecxi’ Gluck 
(2013) describes it as ‘the Minecraft of military-sim games… this entire island is a canvas.’ 
 
Players spending significant time with the game will inevitably discover that the main island on 
which ARMA 3 is set, and which is modelled on the terrain of the real Greek island of Lemnos 
(referred to in-game as ‘Altis’), features numerous renewable energy installations strewn across 
its 270 km2 terrain. An aerial tour of the island reveals wind farms dotted along several 
prominent hills, with their lazy blades chopping the air; industrial scale solar-thermal 
installations near the island’s main airfield (a common starting location) which focus the sun’s 
rays onto a central tower in order to power a steam turbine; fields of solar photovoltaic panels 
that abound in numerous areas; and, if one knows where to look, tidal-power generating buoys 
submerged off the coast of the southern beaches, with the occasional stray hauled up on land. 
The whole island is noticeably missing the familiar structures one associates with 20th Century 
fossil fuel power generation, and the iconic cooling towers of coal or nuclear fired power stations 
with plumes of rising steam. Instead, there are only bright, shining solar panels, thermal towers 
and an impressive number of wind farms. The landscape-architectural aesthetic of the island of 
Altis is dominated by the visible presence of renewable power generation. 
 
 
Figure 1 – One of several prominent wind farms located in the southern part of Altis 
 
Set in the near-future period of the 2030s, ARMA 3’s designers have devoted much time to 
evoking a very particular near-future feel, particularly through weapons and vehicle designs. It 
introduces camouflage patterns plausibly extrapolated from contemporary ‘pixel based’ military 
uniforms, as well as weapons and vehicle technologies that appear perfectly logical future-
oriented extensions of current designs. The prominent and repeated use of hexagonal shapes and 
visual motifs give many vehicles the angular look reminiscent of contemporary stealth 
technology – a technology that remains even now relatively ‘futuristic’ despite its familiarity. 
These visual design choices evoke a plausible yet still unfamiliar near-future feel. 
 
The overall effect of this is that it locates the player within a particular vision or idea of the 
future, one that is not necessarily consciously engaged with, but which is nevertheless sensibly or 
cognitively apprehend. The aesthetic presentation of future oriented military hardware, coupled 
with the aesthetic presence of renewable energy power generation, assembles a particular vision 
or argument for a possible future. Most importantly of all, the future that ARMA 3 is presenting 
as its gameplay's backdrop is a future in which a full-scale transition to renewable energy in 
domestic power generation has already occurred. The prospect of this, and of players 
encountering, becoming acquainted with, and even accustomed to this, when examined in light 
of contemporary national and international political inertia on the issue, is highly exciting. For in 
spite of all its militarism, by presenting this image of a future filled with renewable energy the 
game actually presents in some sense a politically optimistic vision of the future. ARMA 3 says 
aesthetically that a world of renewable energy is possible, and crucially it does not say this either 
in so many words or through the typical contraction of meaning through mechanics approach to 
game design. In fact, ARMA 3’s vision is far more arresting precisely because it is conveyed 
aesthetically, through this projection of a particular vision of the future.  
 
 
[Figure 2 – A large-scale solar installation near Altis’ main airfield]  
 
Informed by this perspective, this paper departs from existing game studies consensus on the 
nature and efficacy of games’ persuasive powers, which has commonly seen an emphasis on the 
mechanics of gameplay and what is seen as their potential to provoke player reflection, 
introspection and attendant changes in attitudes, opinions and behaviours. Instead, I will argue 
that this persuasion through mechanics approach faces significant barriers when dealing with 
highly contentious (even ideological) issues. I argue for the power of aesthetic visions in games, 
and the power of these to more effectively perform ideological critique, by readily getting ‘under 
the skin’ of the player, bypassing the typical rational reasoning that is involved with simulatory 
mechanics that seek to interrogate. In the remainder of this paper I do three things: firstly, I seek 
to establish the importance of cultural visions of the future and their political impact on our 
conceptions of what’s possible. Secondly, I argue that the nature of the problem of convincing or 
persuading individuals to acknowledge the seriousness and importance of climate change is 
highly ideological, presenting challenges for existing theories about games potential for 
persuasion. This leads to the final task of this paper, which is to argue for the critical importance 
of the aesthetic nature of ARMA 3’s vision of a climate future, as it is far more likely to enable 
ideological critique by eschewing persuasion via mechanics or simulation techniques, which are 
likely to be consciously rejected. This suggests a challenging conclusion for games aspiring to 
climate and environmental activism, and for existing ideas about best approaches to designing 
games with these ends in mind – current approaches having thus far largely failed to engage with 
the problems posed by ideology. 
 
‘The slow cancellation of the future’  
 
Italian autonomist Franco ‘Bifo’ Berardi has described the political project of neoliberalism as 
‘the slow cancellation of the future,’ (Berardi, 2011: 18) an outcome of the political project that 
has been underway since the 1970s. Berardi (2009, 2011) frequently returns to the importance of 
the idea of the future, and the changing relationships we have had with the future under different 
historical periods: ‘In the modern era, the future was imagined thanks to metaphors of progress’ 
(Berardi, 2009: 121) but as the institutions and ideological formations of left political progress 
broke down under neoliberalism, Berardi claims, ‘what… disappeared, more than anything else, 
is the credibility of a progressive model for the future.’ (Ibid: 122) In a way, the future itself, or 
at least a certain cultural and imagined relation to it, has disappeared.  
 
Contemporary material and political conditions, according to Berardi and a growing number of 
others, have been transformed as a result of the neoliberal project. (Crary, 2014; Mitropoulos, 
2012; Fisher, 2014) This political project has brought with it increasing precarity, risk and 
insecurity for workers, and for many an undermining of the material conditions of life previously 
guaranteed through the welfare state of the 20th Century. (Harvey, 2005; Hall, 2011; Hamilton, 
2012; Davies, 2014) The result is our collective and cultural expectations, even our very ability 
to conceive of certain kinds of futures, have been seriously altered. It is only a small step from 
this instability and uncertainty to the looming threat of global climate change, which further 
threatens to wipe out our future entirely. (Collings, 2014) 
 
Alvin Toffler’s (1970) famous work Future Shock introduced the notion that the future was a 
place of change and uncertainty, experienced as a series of shocks precipitated by the increasing 
rate of change in society. But for British cultural critic and philosopher Mark Fisher, the shock of 
the future is less pertinent than the surprising ‘persistence of recognizable forms’ (Fisher, 2014: 
7). As he explains,  
 
It was through the mutations of popular music that many of those who grew up in the 
1960s, 70s and 80s learned to measure the passage of cultural time. But faced with 21st 
century music, it is the very sense of future shock which has disappeared. (Fisher, 2014: 
7) 
 
Fisher (2014) extends Berardi’s line of thinking about the loss or disavowal of the future, 
combining it with an analysis of the sense of cultural time in the present, drawing attention to the 
particular emphasis placed upon nostalgia and the return of familiar forms: 
 
In 1981, the 1960s seemed much further away than they do today. Since then, cultural time 
has folded back on itself, and the impression of linear development has given way to a 
strange simultaneity. (Fisher, 2014: 9) 
 
Like Berardi (2009, 2011), Fisher (2014) locates his explanation for this shift in a change to 
modes of cultural development and renewal. Similarly, he finds the neoliberal mode of late 
capitalism responsible for contemporary culture becoming locked in what Fredric Jameson called 
a ‘nostalgia mode,’ with the eternal return of older cultural forms and styles, and an inability to 
generate the truly ‘new’. Fisher (2014: 15) notes that, ‘despite all its rhetoric of novelty and 
innovation, neoliberal capitalism has gradually but systematically deprived artists of the 
resources necessary to produce the new.’  
 
Fisher has also coined a term to describe the way capitalism has colonized the minds and 
imaginations of Western citizens, making capitalism seem both natural and inevitable. (Fisher, 
2009) He describes ‘capitalist realism’ as the abiding ideology of our age, after Margaret 
Thatcher’s famous slogan ‘There is no alternative.’ Capitalist realism captures this sense of 
inevitability, the impossibility of difference or contingency, and of lacking a future that is 
significantly different from the present. Instead, what is laid out before us is an elongated, 
prolonged and exacerbated now. This is again a conception of the future not as chronological 
time but as cultural idea, existing within and operating on the collective imaginary. The future is 
by necessity a space of possibility-to-be-otherwise, and it is this dimension that is foreclosed by 
the modern developments of neoliberal capitalism, and capitalist realism’s claim that the way 
things are now is simply how things must always be. Needless to say, this ‘capitalist realism’ is a 
highly ideological vision, even as history has time and again shown just how incredibly fragile 
and fleeting any one particular socio-political arrangement is. And yet, imagining a different 
future outside of the coordinates set by capital and its unsustainable focus on growth, even such 
that it begins to threaten our very existence on the planet, is incredibly difficult to envisage.  
 
In light of this, the value of ARMA 3’s positive projection of a renewable energy future becomes 
clear. We can perhaps trace its alternative ‘realism’ (contra-‘capitalist realism’) to the game’s 
adherence to a kind of military realism, which has undoubtedly inspired much of the game’s 
design and hence its particular vision of the future. Consider the fact that the US Military’s top 
planners in the Pentagon have contingency plans in place for US naval bases likely to be 
inundated by climate change, as well as long-range strategic plans that incorporate climate 
change considerations in other ways. (Pellerin, 2013) This kind of military realism is more 
closely aligned with a materialist analysis than with capitalist realism, despite the military’s 
frequent alignment with some of the worst capitalist tendencies in the form of the military-
industrial complex. The presence of ‘climate realism’ is perhaps more due to the fact that, as part 
of its conservative threat-analysis mission, the military needs to acknowledge real risks to 
security (which includes future risks from climate change).  
 
When the cultural sphere has imagined ‘the end’ of present sets of socio-political arrangements it 
has often taken the form of the imagined apocalypse, and of which there is no shortage of 
examples in games. Since the landmark title Wasteland (1988) and the various series it has 
inspired, including the contemporary Fallout series (1997-2010), games have long drawn on the 
potent cultural imaginings around cold war fears of nuclear annihilation. Similarly, there is no 
shortage of viral and other ‘zombie’ apocalypses in gaming.  
 
But as Berardi (2009: 132) notes, these cultural visions of disaster and the end of civilization 
have not always been so ascendant: 
 
only today, at the beginning of the twenty first century, does dystopia take centre stage 
and conquers the whole field of the artistic imagination, thus drawing the narrative 
horizon of the century with no future.  
 
Evan Calder Williams (2011), Marxist author and poet, has written about the History Channel’s 
popular series ‘Life After People’ (2008-10) that imagines a post-apocalypse where human 
beings have disappeared completely from the face of the earth leaving behind all their urban 
developments to be slowly reclaimed by nature. He argues that the real ‘libidinal surge’ and 
pleasure of viewing this type of imaginary comes in asking 
 
what would happen if we were gone, what would the built world of capital be without us, 
its constant attendants and hand-servants, what would happen if the dialectic of nature 
and capital became a battle the latter was doomed to lose? (Williams, 2011: 175) 
 
But for Williams, this surface level exercise is not by itself productive of an alternative future, 
posing no challenge to the present. Instead, a more substantial apocalyptic imagining consists of 
envisaging the end of the construct that is “time” and its particular role in structuring the human 
life: 
 
the series in all its doom and gloom and overblown aesthetics of digital decay… nails the 
distinction between the end of the world and the end of days. It’s the latter which is 
properly apocalyptic… the sense of the end of “day” as a unit of time measure: the work 
day, with its corollary equal segments of play and sleep. Not an end of history per se, but 
an end of our pseudo-cycles of history that consist of interlocking, unhalting 8-hour 
blocks. (Calder Williams, 2011: 178. My emphasis.) 
 
Fisher (2009) himself has a great phrase describing the horizon of our best collective 
expectations for the future as a hope for ‘managed decline’ – with capitalist realism asserting that 
such is the best we can expect: averting disaster while things slowly deteriorate. Once again, I 
find great value in ARMA 3’s vision of a renewable future, one in which climate change is 
implicitly being addressed through renewable energy, presenting a compelling counterpoint to 
the hopelessness that surrounds capitalist realist visions of the future. 
 
Games, Ecology, Climate Change 
 
Before proceeding it is important to engage with existing literature’s suggestions for games 
productive engagement with the issue of climate change. Various attempts have been made to 
describe or argue for the persuasive efficacy of games, and their capacity to advocate for real 
world changes through engaging players directly. Typically this is articulated as prompting 
players to interrogate or question their various attitudes and beliefs about either climate change 
or related environmental concerns.  
 
In conference proceedings of the GLS game summit, Kearny Bell-Gawne (2013: 94) has argued 
for the ability of the power of games’ simulations to change or influence player beliefs about 
environmental policy. She argues for games utility as ‘a tool to better inform policy and research 
around environmental issues such as sustainability, food, and climate change.’ (Bell-Gawne, 
2013: 94) Her conclusions, however, are fairly provisional and rest upon one small case study. 
Kelly and Nardi (2014) argue more forcefully that games in the ‘survival/crafting’ genre (such as 
Minecraft (2011-15), Rust (2013), and 7 Days to Die (2013)) can lead players through 
‘imaginative visions of situational potentials and solutions to problems’. Kelly and Nardi (2014) 
here approach the same analysis that I am arguing for, namely the imaginative power of cultural 
visions. However, their argument largely falls back upon mechanic-centric approaches to games’ 
power to persuade. Kelly and Nardi (2014) argue that games can have players engage with 
problems like resource scarcity and the necessary social changes these situations suggest. A 
particular excellent example of a game designed explicitly with resource scarcity in mind is Ken 
Eklund and Jane McGonigal’s World Without Oil, (2007) which encouraged players to envision 
creative solutions to problems arising from ‘peak oil.’ Of course, as climate activists like Bill 
McKibben (2012) and Naomi Klein (2014) have begun pointing out, the earth has more than 
enough existing reserves of oil, coal and other fossil fuels to well and truly ensure the global 
climate can be changed beyond recognisability or any hope of recovery should their use continue 
unabated. 
 
Kelly and Nardi (2014) however go further than simply arguing for games’ powers to provoke 
reflection or conscious engagement with resource scarcity scenarios, arguing the importance of 
specific mechanics in effecting these reflections: ‘good game mechanics can cultivate 
imaginative visions of situational potentials and solutions to problems.’ (2014) They argue game 
elements that simulate or represent sustainable practices ‘could provide material for the thematic 
and aesthetic design elements of new games. Global futures games can make visible the 
possibility of low/no growth as a challenging and achievable goal.’ (Ibid.)  
 
Matt Barton (2008) has discussed the history of games simulation of weather. Like the previous 
authors, he argues for more consideration and inclusion of environmental simulations in 
contemporary games, asking rhetorically: ‘how can games acknowledge the threat of global 
warming when game characters fail to take notice of a torrential downpour on their heads?’ 
(Barton, 2008) Likewise, Alenda Chang (2011) largely concurs with Barton’s perspective and 
makes a similar implicit call for greater development of complexity in the relationships between 
player and game environment. Chang (2011: 60) states that ‘game designers have yet to develop 
more sophisticated rules for interaction between players and game environments’ repeating the 
focus on mechanics largely to the exclusion of other considerations around how games might 
impact significant cultural issues. Chang suggests the current problem is that ‘games naively 
reproduce a whole range of instrumental relations that we must reimagine’ (Chang, 2011: 60) 
and in the same vein as both Kelly and Nardi (2014) and Bell-Gawne (2013), adds that ‘more 
environmentally realistic games could affect our understanding of real-world environmental 
issues, either by implicitly or explicitly modelling different forms of our individual and 
collective environmental agency.’ (Chang, 2011: 60)  
 
This idea of greater player engagement with a complex environment is taken up by Kyle 
Bohunicky (2014) who argues in ‘Ecocomposition: Writing ecologies in Digital Games’ that in 
Minecraft (2011-2015), players experience and act out greater environmental agency than is 
typical. This includes engaging in the writing of terms like ‘shelter’ or ‘transportation’ onto the 
environment, arranging different block materials into buildings and other structures. (Bohunicky, 
2014) The primary claim Bohunicky (2014) makes is that the survival/crafting genre has a 
unique relationship with nature and ecologies; in other genres these concepts are often ‘situated 
at the game’s margins as scenic backdrops for grand conflicts between players and other 
humans/technology,’ while survival/crafting games embed players within ‘a nature and 
ecosystem.’ (Bohunicky, 2014: 225) The effects of player development upon the procedurally 
generated “natural” landscape ‘leaves sizeable scars on the game’s terrain.’ (Bohunicky, 2014: 
231) Like Barton (2008) earlier, Chang (2011) asks why games must, 
 
replicate the same kind of costly obliviousness we see every day in the nonvirtual 
world—the refusal to acknowledge or even attempt to understand our role in climate 
change, environmental degradation, and species loss—when they could instead take such 
factors into account, with very interesting results? (Chang, 2011: 61) 
 
Yet it is not entirely clear what is entailed by this observation – should Minecraft present players 
with protesting environmentalists who chain themselves to trees? It appears that it is not enough 
to present players with the consequences of their actions on the landscape itself.  
 
Approaching this problem with more nuance is Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greg de Peuter’s 
(2009) work on games’ entanglement with processes of global capital and empire. They evaluate 
the genre of “policy simulator” citing at least seven games by name. Variously these are about 
faming, climate, weather, business, capitalism, etc., however they note these games’ questionable 
environmentalist credentials:  
 
Most code neoliberal assumptions: Food Force, for example, engages players with issues 
of global famine but never really probes the structure of the world market. Other serious 
games are sponsored by flagrantly hypocritical corporate philanthropy. (Dyer-Witheford 
and de Peuter, 2009: 201) 
 
Whether these games teach their players’ neoliberal assumptions, and indeed whether there is 
any clear or obvious relationship between the assumptions games “code” into their systems and 
changes in player attitudes or behaviours, are incredibly difficult questions to answer. In the 
following section, I engage with these issues and their entanglement with the issue of ideology 
specifically and the problems this entanglement produces for existing literature on games.  
 
Games Persuasion and Ideological Entanglement 
 
There is no shortage of theoretical approaches seeking to explain games’ persuasive, activist, or 
even pedagogical potential, with many of the contributions mentioned in the previous section 
drawing upon one or another framework for understanding this question. James Paul Gee has 
done some of the earliest foundational work on games potential to teach and influence players. 
(2003) His work primarily focuses on players and the contexts in which they engage in 
“learning” – for a definition of learning that is active, critical and engaged (a far cry from the 
passive reception of facts or the accumulation of knowledge). For Gee (2003: 46), ‘video games 
have the potential to lead to active and critical learning’ but he importantly also acknowledges 
the active role of the player themselves in this process, asking quite aptly: ‘what ensures that a 
person plays video games in a way that involves active and critical learning and thinking? 
Nothing, of course, can ensure such a thing.’ (Gee, 2003: 46) This is an important caveat often 
critically lacking from some of the more evangelical theories of how games create meaning and 
can effect change. It underscores the individual’s active engagement, while crucially leaving 
room for the mystifying operation of ideology – an essential point for the topic of climate 
change, which I shall return to in a moment. 
 
In her introduction to The Ecology of Games, a collection of work on games’ ability to facilitate 
change or learning in players, Katie Salen offers the following summary of the existing discourse 
in this area, which ‘has been, to date, overly polemic and surprisingly shallow.’ (Salen, 2008: 2) 
Indeed, the ‘value’ of games and their ability to challenge cultural and ideological constructions 
has been mired by extremes of both panegyric defensiveness and the (itself highly ideological) 
‘neutral tools’ discourses ported over from much of the culture around science and technology, 
which has itself been widely interrogated in other fields (Winner, 1986; Latour, 1988; Haraway, 
1991) 
 
In Stevens et al.’s (2008) chapter in The Ecology of Games the authors contribute an important 
framework for understanding the assumptions of much research into the effects of games on 
players, rejecting what they describe as a ‘separate worlds view’ of games and their impact on 
players. They offer a research method influenced by ‘situated, everyday, or distributed cognition’ 
(Stevens et al., 2008: 42) that looks at ordinary everyday situations in order to have a ‘basis to 
credibly claim that our research accounts are about how and what people do, learn, and think in 
daily life, and not simply about what they do within the context of contrived laboratory tasks’ 
(Stevens et al., 2008: 42). Their goal is interrogating this ‘separate worlds view’, drawing upon 
the concept of ‘transference’, itself a contentious term describing the application in one domain 
of skills and/or knowledge gained from another (e.g.: skills learned in games applied in “the real 
world”). Stevens et al.’s (2008) concern is to account for the fact that ‘the culture of game play is 
one that is quite tangled up with other cultural practices, which include relations with siblings 
and parents, patterns of learning at home and school, as well as imagined futures for oneself.’ 
(Stevens et al., 2008: 43) Their conclusions offer no simple answers as to the ‘effects’ of games 
on their players: 
 
an “answer” to the question of how media consuming and repurposing has affected these 
young people is complicated and contingent; it depends on differing dispositions and 
purposes that people bring to play, who they play with, and perhaps more importantly 
what people make of these experiences in other times and places in their lives. (Stevens et 
al., 2008: 63) 
 
This focus on contingent dimensions of individual players is often missing from some accounts, 
and Stevens et al. (2008) note that with their conclusions they are deliberately ‘stepping quite far 
away from any simple generalizations about effects of video game play.’ (Stevens et al., 2008: 
63) A similar lacuna in much of the related literature on games and the “learning” opportunities 
they present to players is any account for the problems and barriers that ideology presents. 
Namely, the efficiency with which games’ persuasive powers are presumed to be able to offer 
ideological critique is insufficient when faced with a more comprehensive understanding of 
ideology and its effects, especially when it comes to the critically important yet highly resisted 
issue of climate change.  
 
In his landmark text Persuasive Games Ian Bogost addresses the question of games performing 
ideological critique and more general forms of persuasion. (Bogost, 2007) Bogost notes that, 
‘hidden procedural systems that drive social, political, or cultural behaviour are often called 
ideology’ (2007: 72) and this formulation of ideology crucially connects to his overall argument 
about games efficacy in enabling players to grapple meaningfully, even critically, with systems 
or procedures. Bogost traces a short history of the term ‘ideology’ across a number of not always 
entirely reconcilable thinkers and traditions. He begins with its etymological origins with 
Antoine Destutt de Tracy as a ‘science of the origin of ideas’ (Bogost, 2007: 73), to Marx’s 
implications for ideology (that ‘ideology entails the delusion that ideas are material’ (Ibid.)) to 
Althusser’s modification of Gramscian ideology. Bogost finally settles on Žižek’s approach to 
ideology, which is largely a materialist perspective. In Bogost’s estimation, ‘Althusser 
essentially collapses the realm of ideas completely into material practice’ (Ibid.: 74) with his 
focus on ideology’s instantiation in apparatuses, while for Žižek 
 
‘Ideology remains material… but this material reality is distorted and malignant. 
Ideology is not just a false representation of reality, it has become a part of reality itself, 
disfiguring it.’ (Ibid.: 74) 
 
As a consequence of this, Bogost concludes that for games, as in other forms of political-
rhetorical persuasion, ‘the challenge that faces political critique, then, is to identify the distortion 
in material practice.’ (Ibid.: 74) Ultimately then his argument is undermined by a rather limited 
conception of ideology, treating it more like an engineering problem to be overcome rather than 
a problem involving humans, personal beliefs, and often a deep abiding struggle over questions 
of great personal significance. Nevertheless, Bogost’s procedural rhetoric retains a valuable 
awareness of the space for individual resistance to persuasion (as might occur when a player 
discounts an idea ideologically opposed to their own views) through the term ‘simulation fever’: 
 
The disparity between the simulation and the player’s understanding of the source system 
it models creates a crisis in the player; I named this crisis simulation fever, a madness 
through which an interrogation of the rules that drive both systems begins. (Bogost, 2007: 
332-3) 
 
Though Bogost only envisages simulation fever occurring when a player resists the procedural 
instantiation of a real world system unfaithfully reproduced, I want to suggest that it may be 
more usefully conceptualized as resistance to a particular procedural implementation for any 
reason whatsoever. Simulation fever does not need to be constrained to inaccurate pictures of the 
world, instead usefully encompassing any resistance to the way a procedure operates. After all, 
how could we evaluate the faithfulness of a procedure to the real world without involving our 
own ideological predispositions – or without invoking a naïve and just as ideological vision of 
the world in itself? 
 
Within Bogost’s brief history of ideology, however, we can find the traces of a more developed 
analysis of the concept. Terry Eagleton (1991) describes in much more detail two distinct, but 
not entirely separate, traditions of thought regarding ideology that clarifies this problem of 
ideology: 
 
One central lineage, from Hegel and Marx to Georg Lukacs and some later Marxist 
thinkers, has been much preoccupied with ideas of true and false cognition, with ideology 
as illusion, distortion and mystification; whereas an alternative tradition of thought has 
been less epistemological than sociological, concerned more with the function of ideas 
within social life than with their reality or unreality. (Eagleton, 1991: 3) 
 
Eagleton (1991: 3) finds that everyday uses of the term ‘ideology’ have more in common with 
the former ‘mystified’ perspective than the latter, noting that to claim something or someone as 
‘speaking ideologically is surely to hold that they are judging a particular issue through some 
rigid framework of preconceived ideas which distorts their understanding. I view things as they 
really are; you squint at them though a tunnel vision imposed by some extraneous system of 
doctrine.’ Yet it is inconceivable anyone could successfully claim to say that anything is ever 
entirely free from distortion (and thus ideology). Additionally, Eagleton (1991: xiv) notes, when 
attempting ideological critique, ‘it is important to see that… only those interventions will work 
which make sense to the mystified subject itself.’ This is worth emphasising, as it underscores 
the nature of the problem as one that cannot be solved automatically through the simple 
presentation of ‘reality’ in given state of affairs. And yet a significant problem remains within 
the concept of ideology since, 
 
if there is nothing which is not ideological, then the term cancels all the way through and 
drops out of sight. To say this does not commit one to believing that there is a kind of 
discourse which is inherently non-ideological; it just means that in any particular 
situation you must be able to point to what counts as non-ideological for the term to have 
meaning. (Eagleton, 1991: 9) 
 
These last two points are perhaps Eagleton’s most salient contributions, highlighting that 
ideology involves struggles over meaning and belief systems, but that these are struggles both 
with individuals with preferences, tastes and sensibilities, and a question of social formations and 
the exercise of power. On this last point Eagleton (1991: 5) elaborates that often ‘ideology has to 
do with legitimating the power of a dominant social group or class’ and capitalist realism, as 
discussed earlier, demonstrates this clearly, as it is self-sustaining and self-legitimating: there is 
no alternative but more of the same. 
 
When it comes to games, then, the idea of a game performing ideological critique remains 
plausible, with the proviso that it must appeal to, or makes sense for the ‘mystified’ player 
themselves (even those who reject climate change outright). If the player rejects the ‘reality’ of a 
climate change simulation then they are experiencing simulation fever, and if they are 
ideologically predisposed to reject belief in the phenomenon, then it is hard to see how they 
could be convinced by any number of simulations, no matter how great their degree of fidelity to 
the real world. But there is an alternative to this kind of direct assault on the mystified player’s 
beliefs and sensibilities, and keeping this in mind I now to turn to describe some of the 
characteristics of the issue of climate change as particularly ideological in nature, before 
discussing how ideological critique can occur without relying upon the fidelity of a simulation. 
 
Climate Change, Ideology and ARMA 3 
 
One of the foremost thinkers of climate change and its implications for human life and meaning 
(beyond simply environmental and material considerations) is David Collings (2014) who, in a 
landmark work, has offered a crucial intervention in our everyday understandings of climate 
change and its implications for both the present and the future. Climate change itself becomes a 
problem that defies the very political and ideological frames with which we have previously 
addressed issues throughout the twentieth century. Collings argues that climate change has stolen 
the future – in the sense that any sober and realistic assessment of our changed climactic future is 
one that sees a rapidly closing window of opportunity to prevent the disastrous, and likely 
irreversible, effects of global climate change. As a result of this closure of the future, Collings 
argues that: 
 
Climate change does not just melt the ice caps and glaciers; it melts the narrative in which we 
still participate, the purpose of the present day. In this sense, too, we are already living in the 
ruins of the future. (Collings, 2014: 116) 
 
This traumatic observation makes it easier to comprehend why the broader public responds to 
climate change with (highly ideological) forms of denial and, perhaps more appositely, even 
more common forms of unconscious neglect. In Collings’ assessment 
 
climate change is nothing less than an assault on who we think we are: it exposes the fact 
that the economies of the developed world are founded on a lie, that our way of life takes 
for granted the eventual destruction of the Earth, and that persisting with it makes us 
complicit in a great crime. (Collings, 2014: 17) 
 
Collings also notes, similar to Fisher’s (2014) cultural time of simultaneity discussed earlier, that 
‘without a future, there is no present and not much of a past. Climate change isn't just about our 
obligation to others. It's about our own lives, too.’ (Collings, 2014: 19) The serious impact that 
climate change has on our own sense of the future has important cultural effects, with Collings 
(2014: 19) noting that ‘the future is never just for the people of the future; without that future, 
what we do now loses its force.’ The threat of climate change and its impact, ‘too awful’ to even 
consider without damaging a sense of present and future, would seem to suggest grounds for 
rejections of simulations with high degrees of fidelity. 
 
Perhaps counter intuitively for a ‘sandbox’ game ARMA 3 makes no attempt to ‘model’ or 
actually ‘simulate’ power generation in its world. Nor does it simulate the political process 
required to get from ‘here’ to ‘there’ in the struggle to decarbonize whole economies, a 
significant omission given the real political problems which face many climate change measures 
like building renewable energy facilities at the scale needed for Western economies. Nor does 
ARMA 3 model the resistance to change and political lobbying of the huge vested interests 
arrayed against such a transition. It does not model the more sensational and spectacular impacts 
of climate change – the background of increased risk of devastating climactic events, rising sea 
levels, unstable changes in local environments, etc. No mechanics or appreciable ‘gameplay’ is 
directly concerned with any of these issues in ARMA 3. Instead, it simply presents the player 
with the visual and aesthetic presence of renewable power generation, with no added text 
explanation or narrative context. It presents the player with a vision of the future that runs 
dramatically counter to the current ‘closure’ of the future as Berardi (2009, 2011) and Fisher 
(2014) have described. Indeed, it is quite likely that these renewable power generation methods 
present in the game were not even chosen to make a political point as such – more likely they are 
present so as to evoke a near-future technological feel. Indeed, Mediterranean states take-up of 
renewable energy and the modelling of ARMA 3’s terrain on a real Greek island likely 
contributed more to this dimension than any concerted aims to ‘convince’ players of the 
importance of addressing climate change. 
 
But the point I am arguing is that a lack of mechanics or ‘gameplay’ elements engaging with 
climate change is in fact a preferable mode of engagement with the issue of climate change. By 
engaging solely on an aesthetic level, through the presentation of a particular vision of the future 
with significant renewable energy production, ARMA 3 bypasses the problem that Bogost 
identified in simulation fever – offering no simulation or ‘argument’ about the way the world 
works for the player to reject. To underscore how and why this is preferable, I want to briefly 
compare ARMA 3’s aesthetic vision with the approach taken by two other games that engage 
with climate change in a more traditional manner: Fate of the World (2011) and Anno 2070 
(2011). 
 
The ominously titled Fate of the World offers a more classically ‘persuasive’ engagement with 
climate change through ‘simulation’ of the effects of climate change. The player is placed at the 
head of a world-spanning United Nations tasked with mitigating the worst effects of climate 
change while also trying to meet goals like encouraging third world development. Gameplay 
involves decisions about limited resources (in line with Kelly and Nardi’s (2014) suggestions) 
while maintaining the delicate balance of pleasing member nations while also keeping carbon 
emissions in check. The game sufficiently models the anthropogenic nature of climate change, in 
what seems to be the way Chang (2011) called for. Yet the average player finds out incredibly 
quickly that stemming the tide of rising emissions and maintaining world development goals is a 
nearly impossible task, and the game takes on a certain air of despair. It’s by no means an 
enjoyable experience, and does nothing to address the problem that Collings (2014) identifies 
around the reluctance to engage with the harrowing implications of climate change. Players are 
just as likely to turn away from the game, overwhelmed by its unforgiving difficulty and reject it 
in another case of simulation fever. According to publicly available statistics on the Steam 
platform on which the game is distributed, only just over half of players have even completed the 
first tutorial-style mission “Rise of Africa”, and while there does not appear to be an equivalent 
achievement for other missions, the drop off in completions for other achievements is 
precipitous. This may partially be due to the same dynamics present in other games, with a high 
degree of incompletions across games and genres, but surely a component of this is due to its 
difficulty and the harrowing, bleak nature of the experience.  
 
As Michael Ziser and Julie Zse (2007) have noted, outside of games, Western activism and 
artistic engagement with climate change has often invoked “the sublime” in order to impress 
upon us the massively distributed nature and scale of the issue. However they reject these 
appeals to the magnitude of scale, and the overwhelming aesthetic of the sublime, arguing 
instead that ‘environmental justice aesthetics ought to reject the sublime scale invoked by some 
[Global Climate Change] narratives and instead remain focused on the human, ecological, and 
social justice dimensions of environmental change.’ (Ziser and Zse, 2007: 407) Their argument 
reflects a sensitivity to the problem of simulation fever – rejecting a vision of the problem of 
climate change as incomprehensible, impossible to act upon or do anything about. ‘Sublime’ 
depictions of climate change can be paralysing. 
 
Unlike Fate of the World’s invocation of the sublime dimension of climate change futurity, Anno 
2070, which pits two main rival ideological factions against one another, avoids this pitfall, in 
the process encountering others. In a review of the game for the website Rock, Paper, Shotgun, 
Jim Rossignol (2011) describes the two rival factions as cartoonish caricatures, ‘Eco Dudes and 
Smoke Belchers’ unreflective of the attitudes of either environmentalists or industrialists. 
Rossignol (2011) found its engagement with a climate changed future similarly shallow: ‘there is 
almost no real difference between choosing the dirty industrialists over the eco dudes, and no 
palpable reward for being “green” over eating the planet.’ Along with its narrative setting of a 
flooded earth, cosmetic differences between factions are the extent of its engagement with 
climate change.  
 
The problems these two games face, with their various responses to the sublime horrors of 
climate change, can be usefully contrasted with ARMA 3’s aesthetic vision, which I argue 
suggests the typical analysis of games powers to persuade is incomplete – particularly with 
respect to ideologically charged issues. ARMA 3 suggests another approach is possible, by 
engaging the issues almost indirectly, through the aesthetic realm. 
 
Terry Eagleton (1988) has written extensively on what he calls ‘The Ideology of the Aesthetic,’ 
claiming the invention of the aesthetic ‘marks an historic shift from… coercion to hegemony, 
ruling and informing our sensuous life from within while allowing it to thrive in all its relative 
autonomy.’ (Eagleton, 1988: 328). As a result, he adds, 
 
moral-ideological imperatives no longer impose themselves with the leaden weight of 
some Kantian Ought but infiltrate the very textures of lived experience as tact and know-
how, intuitive good sense or inbred decorum. (Eagleton, 1988: 329) 
 
In other words, its application became more effective than earlier forms of domination and 
control, and Eagleton is ambivalent about the powers of the aesthetic precisely because of this. 
Politics and aesthetics then become deeply intertwined concerns, and Eagleton (1988: 330) 
notes:  
 
it is because pleasurable conduct is the true index of successful social hegemony, self-
delight the very mark of social submission. What matters in aesthetics is not art but this 
whole project of reconstructing the human subject from the inside, informing its subtlest 
affections and bodily responses with this law which is not a law. 
 
The aesthetic, then, is not just simply a matter of taste and opinion but rather a case of 
“reconstructing” the human being in a certain image – and we can see how this applies to ARMA 
3. Having already established the importance of cultural visions of the future, and their 
significance for human lives, both in the grand scheme of human cultural narratives and also in a 
very intimate personal sense – through the importance of having a future for oneself to give 
meaning to actions today – I want to make explicit the work that ARMA 3 is doing. ARMA 3, 
with its use of renewable energy production, envisages a particular future for technology and 
humanity – one which has engaged (and is engaging with) climate change. Importantly, this 
future is signified simply via the aesthetic appearance of wind farms, solar panels, and so on.  
 
ARMA 3 presents a more exciting and optimistic vision of the future than innumerable other 
games which either portray dystopian visions or simply extend the present into the future, 
replicating capitalist realism’s time of cultural simultaneity and closure of imagination – 
imagination, which as we saw earlier, Stevens et al. (2008) affirm the importance of for the 
entangled cultural sphere which games occupy. By sheer dint of its deployment via aesthetic 
dimension, rather than either of Fate of the World or Anno 2070’s mechanical, gameplay focused 
engagements, ARMA 3 offers the player the opportunity to perform what Eagleton described as 
the ‘self-delight’ of social submission to an aesthetic regime of renewables. This submission 
consists of a particular vision of the future, and happens below the level of conscious 
engagement (unlike typical engagement with mechanics), and which suggests a more seductive 
approach appealing to a different aspect of a player’s inner life, and a potential avoidance of 
simulation fever’s outright rejection. However, ARMA 3’s particular aesthetic depiction also has 
the further advantage of avoiding invocation of the sublime, the scale of which may cause 
players to turn away from the problems associated with the issue, overwhelmed. In this way, I 
find an aesthetic engagement such as found in ARMA 3 and it’s rather subtle aesthetic 
engagement with the highly ideological issue of climate change to be much more likely to have 
an enduring cultural impact than conventional attempts to persuade players in a more didactic 




This paper has sought to establish a significant lacuna in extant theories of games generative and 
persuasive social powers regarding the function of ideology, and the question of whether games 
may lead players to change views, behaviours, opinions, etc. Significantly, this lacuna arises 
largely from a limited engagement with the problems that arise from highly ideological subjects 
or themes – such as climate change. Existing work on games and climate change have suggested 
fairly uncontroversially that games might have some power to guide players to consider, 
variously; ‘future scenarios’ of scarcity; the actions that might be rationally required to stave off 
climate change; the way game/player interactions might inform environmental policy; and more 
general problems associated with the worsening of climate change (once sufficiently ‘accurate’ 
simulations can be reproduced in a gaming environment).  
 
Climate change, however, attracts highly ideological attitudes, beliefs and responses, and cannot 
be accounted for simply by models in which individuals are persuaded by ‘the facts themselves’ 
in the form of systems faithful to the operation of the real world. This is because these 
simulations are at best likely to trigger a ‘simulation fever’ type rejection of these systems. 
Moreover, this approach is further complicated by the observation that no simulation could ever 
be said to be entirely free from the distorting effects of ideology itself. Clearly then, some form 
of ideological critique is required, and as Terry Eagleton (1991) has suggested, such a critique 
must be made amenable to the individuals to be persuaded – a perspective affirmed by the 
existing literature on effects of games in the daily lives of their players. Thus, this article 
suggested that in all likelihood the aesthetic dimension and its ability to sidestep the problems 
that ideology presents to rational engagement might give non-mechanical, particularly aesthetic 
representations of imaginative political and material alternatives to present conditions a greater 
cultural purchase, avoiding more conscious barriers to resistance that occur when a user 
experiences simulation fever. This paper has not sought to prove definitively that ARMA 3 will 
persuade each and every player that engages with it – or even, in fact, whether it has definitively 
persuaded any, for as Stevens et al. (2008: 63-4) remind us, learning from and responding to 
games ‘is best understood as an action that a person actively does rather than an automatic 
process that happens to a person’s mind under appropriate conditions.’ Future researchers may 
wish to engage with ARMA 3’s playerbase to identify practical outcomes from exposure to the 
game, however a more fruitful line of research is likely to emerge from consideration of the 
ongoing and broad cultural effects of aesthetic depictions of renewable energy across multiple 
games and media, with a growing number of examples making use of the visual aesthetic of 
renewables. 
 
Through the placement of prominent visual representations of renewable power generation 
across ARMA 3’s main island of Altis, the game paints a picture of a possible future in which 
existing political resistance to low-carbon and renewable economies has been overcome – an 
important feature to note given the importance of cultural visions of the future, as Berardi (2009, 
2011) and Fisher (2014) have both emphasised. For these reasons, I find the aesthetic vision of 
ARMA 3 suggests important implications for current understandings of games’ persuasive 
potential, showing how important interventions can be made through aesthetics in ways not 
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